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It is a great pleasure for me to take part in this conference on “The Open Economy Macromodel:
Past, Present and Future.” My comparative advantage today is unmistakably on the “past”
component of the sub-title and I shall therefore speak somewhat autobiographically about my role
in the development of this model and influences from predecessors and contemporaries and reserve
for closing remarks some limitations of the model and opportunities for its use in the future.  
    
I
 
I have read interpretations of my work that have made stylistic facts about the “early” and
the “late” Mundell, the first being a Keynesian, the second, a Classicist. Such periods may
be relevant to painters, but are they really applicable to economists? I am not myself aware
of any basic shift of direction. I did write on different subjects and use different models at
different points in time, but why not? I worked on what came to be called the Mundell-
Fleming model mainly over the years 1960-64, but both before, after, and during this period,
I was also publishing my work on the pure theory of trade, monetary theory, optimum
currency areas, the public debt, the monetary approach to the balance of payments, customs
unions and the theory of inflation. The agenda, models and information changed, but the
periodization doesn’t ring true.  
If there was an “early” Mundell, it would have to be the classical one. Let me start as close
to the beginning as seems necessary, after I had completed my doctorate exams at MIT in the
spring of 1955. A that time I received a Mackenzie King Traveling Scholarship from Canada
and decided to use it to study at the London School of Economics. I had a special interest in
the work of Lionel (later Lord) Robbins and (later Sir) James Meade.
I got a nice letter of acceptance directly from Meade, and he agreed to be “supervise” my
thesis (for MIT) up until March 1956, when he was to leave for New Zealand. I want to
discuss my relations with Meade. I saw him in his office about once a week, and also
participated in, besides the Robbins theory seminar,  the Meade-Robson [Robson was a
political scientist] seminar on international economics, as well as lectures by Harry Johnson,
2This negative, even harsh review of Meade’s book cost Harry Johnson a
friendship in Lionel Robbins, who was tenaciously loyal to his friends, and who only agreed
to speak to Harry again on the occasion of Arnold Harberger’s wedding in London in 1958!].
3One has to understand Meade’s remark in the context of his own innate, self-effacing
modesty, just as one would not want to take too literally John Stuart Mill’s statement in his
Autobiography, that he wasn’t any smarter than his contemporaries, it was just that he started a
generation ahead of them!
who came up from Cambridge once a week to give a course in which he read–yes, read--his
latest papers. In those two terms I wrote two papers, “Transport Costs in International Trade
Theory” (Can. Jour., 1957), and “International Trade and Factor Mobility” (AER June 1957),
which were two of five chapters of my MIT Ph.D. thesis. The latter article I presented in the
Meade-Robson seminar, and I got helpful comments on it from Tadeusz Rybczynski, Dick
Lipsey, Max Corden, Steve Ozga as well as James Meade and Harry Johnson. Throughout
that year  and the following summer in Boston my work was entirely on aspects of the
classical or Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade and I had no discussions about macroeconomics
with Meade or anyone else.
I had “read” Meade’s Mathematical Supplement. In June 1998 Max Corden stayed with me
in Siena a few days, and reminded me of a conversation we had at the time. When asked
whether I had read Meade’s Balance of Payments, I replied: “No, but I have read his
Mathematical Supplement!”  This gave me the reputation (along with the prestige of coming
from MIT), quite unmerited, that I was a mathematician. One didn’t read the Mathematical
Supplement. It was almost as tedious as the main book. What was exasperating was the
taxonomy, roundly criticized by Harry Johnson in his review,2 Meade has a very amusing
footnote on combinations at the bottom of page 33, where he contributes the interesting
combinatorial information, confirmed by William Baumol, that there were precisely 28, 781,
143, 379 possible solutions to his model! 
Much later, in 1970, during a walk in the foothills of Mount Fuji, Meade told me that he had
a mind like Pigou’s–a “meat-grinder’s mind,” he said! He told a story about Pigou on his way
out after a lecture being asked by a student if he had not made an error in the sign of an
elasticity, at which point Pigou marched back up to the podium to his notes (presumably left
for his assistant to return), looked up the relevant section, and simply replied: no!]. Meade
said that he wrote down the equations, differentiated them and reported the results in his
book. It wasn’t very exciting, but his two volumes and their appendices were nevertheless
landmarks in the development of international economic theory.3 
I learned a lot from Meade, of course. Not macroeconomics, but his brilliant contributions
to the classical model.  This influence can be seen all through my “Pure Theory of
International Trade” article (AER 1960), which was an expansion (and contraction) of two
of the five chapters of my thesis. When you asked a question like: How much will a tariff,
or unilateral transfer, or productivity change alter the terms of trade (or some other variable),
you would find that Meade had produced the first definitive answer to that question. I was
able to develop his work in some new areas, develop some of the dynamics, and generalize
the model, following up on the pioneering general equilibrium works of Yntema and Mosak,
in a multi-country framework.  
Nevertheless Meade’s Mathematical Supplement to the Balance of Payments contains the
equations of an international macroeconomic model. But when I was doing my work on this
subject a few years later, I never made any connections to it, although it must have
influenced me at least sub-consciously. The reason, I think, is that my approach came
through a Walrasian-like general equilibrium theory, which was at best only implicit in
Meade’s analysis. There was, however, one important insight in Meade’s work that I used
extensively in my macroeconomics as well as in my classical “Pure Theory...” article. This
was the way in which “domestic expenditure,” called “absorption” in Sydney Alexander’s
1952 article in IMF Staff Papers, was treated as a variable. Of course Metzler and Machlup
had used expenditure functions depending on income in their international multiplier work,
Metzler and Laursen had made them dependent on income and the real exchange rate in their
famous joint article in the Review of Economics and Statistics, and Chipman, Goodwin and
Metzler had used them in their treatments of the matrix multiplier. But Meade’s equations
in the Mathematical Supplement broke new ground by making domestic expenditure a
function of income, interest rates, exchange rates, some prices, and all kinds of policy
variables, although he did not develop many of the implications of this novelty.   
In his introduction to the Mathematical Supplement, Meade says he hopes his “model may
somewhat further ...the marriage between the ‘classical’ and ‘Keynesian’ analysis of the
mechanism of the balance of payments...What we need for balance-of-payments theory is a
marriage of the Keynesian and the Hicksian type of analysis; and our model constitutes such
an attempt.” I think that does explain what he attempted to accomplish and I think he was
partly successful in doing so. It was not, however, what I was trying to do in my international
macroeconomic model.
Meade had been, since 1950, an ardent advocate of flexible exchange rates and it was was
a lively subject of discussion at LSE. He had suggested that the signers of the Treaty of
Rome (1956) achieve balance of payments equilibrium for each country by letting exchange
rates float. I didn’t have a strong position on this at the time but could not see why countries
that were in the process of integrating with a common market should saddle themselves with
a new barrier to trade in the form of uncertainty about exchange rates, or how economic
theory could prove that flexible rates were preferable to fixed rates or a single currency. 
II
My interest in macroeconomics in that year 1955-56 in London, was very much beneath the
surface, as I writing a thesis that was entirely a development of the classical and Hecksher-
Ohlin models. I spent the following year 1956-57 as the Post-Doctoral Fellow in Political
Economy at the University of Chicago and here I became especially interested in the work
of Lloyd Metzler in theory and Milton Friedman in policy. Metzler’s architectonic “Wealth-
Saving and Rate of Interest” in the JPE 1950 started me thinking about that model as a more
suitable paradigm for macroeconomics than the Keynesian model and worth developing in
an international framework. By 1955, Patinkin’s work had appeared and the Metzler-Patinkin
general equilibrium approach to the closed macroeconomy provided a more classical full-
employment counterpart to the standard IS-LM framework. 
It was around this time that I shifted research topics from writing about and further refining
the pure classical model to thinking about the way to write down the general equilibrium
equations for an open economy taking into account monetary variables, exchange rates and
capital movements. The fact that Canada had a flexible exchange rate and capital flows
between Canada and the United States were significant background influences but there was
absolutely no model in the literature that was capable of dealing with the subject. I had a few
fruitful conversations with Lloyd Metzler that year that were important. His powers of
communication, however, were much reduced after his brain surgery but had he remained
healthy, he would surely have pioneered the international macroeconomic model. His 1950
article with Svend Laursen was an important step along the way. 
After my year at Chicago, I returned to UBC for the year 1957-58. It was here that I first
presented a discussion of “Optimum Currency Areas” at a faculty seminar. That explains the
North American flavor of the article. At the same time I wrote an expository piece for a
government publication on macroeconomic developments in Canada, and this exercise led
me into putting  together the basic equilibrium equations for the open-economy
macroeconomic model with capital mobility. I was still thinking along these lines when I left
UBC for Stanford University for the year 1958-59. 
It was at Stanford that my version of the international macroeconomic model really came
together. I was teaching the graduate course in international economics and taught my new
equations in it; Jeffrey Williamson surely remembers that class. Equally important was a
faculty seminar which I gave, attended by Bernard Haley (editor of the AER), Kenneth
Arrow, Lorie Tarshis, Ed Shaw, Melvyn Reder, and also Tibor Scitovsky and Abba Lerner
who had come up from Berkeley. I had titled the talk, “A Theory of Optimum Currency
Areas,” but most of it was the Mundell-Fleming model, and it made a big hit. Afterwards,
Lerner chided me for not talking enough about optimum currency areas, but I was able to
give him the gist of the basic argument in a few minutes after the seminar. 
It was at this point that I learned a lesson about marketing. A large number of ideas were put
together in a single paper, tied together as special cases of a basic general equilibrium
macroeconomic model. It included not only optimum currency areas but much of the
comparative statics of the Kyklos and Canadian Journal 1961 papers, and some of the
macrodynamics that became my QJE 1960. I sent it to the Economic Journal and was
4Originally, an acronym for Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates.
disappointed when it came back; (later Sir Roy) Harrod rejected it. But the rejection turned
out to be blessing in disguise! It led to a much more sensible separation of the article into
different parts, to become the 1960 QJE “Monetary Dynamics of International Adjustment
Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates,” the AER 1961 “Optimum Currency Areas”
paper, the Canadian Journal 1961 article on “Employment Policy and Flexible Exchange
Rates,” and the 1961 Kyklos paper, “The International Disequilibrium System.” Ever since,
I have advised students and colleagues to stick to a variant of Tinbergen’s Rule: one idea,
one paper! 
Later, when I became friends with Harrod, I teased him about his rejection of my paper, and
he explained that he had been going through a very stressful situation at the Journal, sorting
out a controversy between Harry Johnson and Don Patinkin over the definition of real
marginal cost. He gave up the editorship soon after.  
It is necessary now to distinguish between two strains of my models. What is called the
“Mundell-Fleming model” is usually taken to refer to that group of articles that includes my
Kyklos 1961, Can. Jour. 1961, IMF Staff Papers 1962, and Can. Jour. 1963, papers, i.e.,
chapters 15, 17, 16, and 18, of my International Economics, including the appendix to
Chapter 18, which was published in the Canadian Journal in 1964. I might note also my
article in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, “On the Selection of a Program
of Economic Policy with an Application to the Current Situation in the United States,”
published in 1963. This article was the first fully-developed global empirical model of the
world economy in a Keynesian framework, a precursor of the forecasting models used by
professional forecasting companies like Otto Eckstein’s Data Resources and Laurence
Klein’s WEFA4. One of the few references I’ve seen to this article is by Egon Sohmen in his
paper “The Assignment Problem” in the Mundell-Swoboda book, p. 183 and 186. These
articles, usually thought about as the Mundell “half” of the Mundell-Fleming model, are
more or less in the tradition of the internationalized IS-LM model. It could also be thought
of as an international multiplier model generalized to incorporate the securities and money
markets. 
III
When I first heard the expression, “Mundell-Fleming model,” later in the 1960s—it was
coined by Rudiger Dornbusch--I supposed it included all my papers on international
macroeconomics, including the first one in the QJE. It was some time before I realized that
my  QJE 1960 paper,, “The Monetary Dynamics of International Adjustment Under Fixed
and Flexible Exchange Rates” (Int. Ec. Ch. 11), was not considered part of the Mundell-
Fleming model! Yet in some respects this first in the series was the most important and set
the methodology for the others. 
Its purpose was to find a way to analyze the difference between an economy with fixed
exchange rates and flexible prices, and an economy with flexible exchange rates with fixed
prices. I needed a coherent and plausible international macroeconomic model that was
consistent with a full-employment economy. There was no such model in the literature. The
paper introduced an internal balance schedule for an open economy and a foreign  balance
schedule (for the first time in the literature). The variables were the interest rate (representing
monetary policy) and the real exchange rate (or the relative prices of home and foreign
goods). The comparative statics of the model could show the effects of expenditure changes
on interest rates and the relative prices. The two schedules demarcated four zones of
disequilibrium and this made possible an examination of the dynamics relevant to two
different policy situations: an economy in which monetary policy was directed at fixing the
exchange rate, compared to an economy in which monetary policy was directed at price-level
stabilization–in modern language, the choice between exchange-rate and inflation targeting.
To me this formulation–the diagram with the FF and XX curves in a plane depicting the rate
of interest on one axis and the real exchange rate (or some other relative price) on the other--
fits the world of today better than the variable output versions. Of course it has to be updated
to make a distinction between nominal and real interest rates, growth curves along the lines
depicted in my Monetary Theory (1971), and a more explicit treatment of the relation
between capital movements and domestic expenditure to produce Ohlin-type transfer effects..
The model found a new application for economic dynamics. Meade, who had one foot in
Marshall, the other in Keynes, had not been concerned at all with dynamics. There were of
course precedents in the dynamics. Samuelson had formulated the dynamics of the Walrasian
system, and Lange, Metzler, Goodwin and Chipman, and later Arrow, Hahn, Uzawa and
others had added more theorems on its dynamic stability; Metzler and Laursen (1950) had
analyzed flexible exchange rates, including a dynamic appendix, in the context of a multiplier
model; Hicks had developed dynamics of trade-cycle theory; Metzler (1951) had an appendix
on dynamics in his “Wealth, Saving and the Rate of Interest,” Patinkin had followed in
Metzler’s footsteps; and Polak had analyzed some dynamics of an international general
equilibrium model. But theorems about dynamic stability had not before been used to settle
the choice between economic policy alternatives, and that was one of the novelties of my
paper.    
When I started writing it, I had no idea what conclusions would emerge. I didn’t create the
model to elucidate or make appealing to the reader conclusions I had already reached by
other means. I used the model as an engine of discovery. I wanted to find out what the
mathematical dynamics of the model could teach me. To differentiate the dynamics of fixed
and flexible rates, I used the same static model for both. The comparative statics of fixed and
flexible exchange systems in my model were essentially the same. But what about the
dynamics? At first I thought that the different dynamics of the two systems (fixed and
flexible rates) didn’t really matter much. From the diagrammatic analysis, it was apparent
that the business cycle sequences were inverted. But why should that matter?
Nevertheless, as a student of Paul Samuelson, I routinely derived the stability conditions for
the two systems. It turned out that, under normal assumptions, both systems were stable.  But
that was not the end of it. It was with great excitement–and I remember the very moment on
that Sunday afternoon in November 1958 in my Menlo Park apartment, just a month before
the birth of my first son–that I noticed that while the stability conditions for fixed and
flexible exchange rates were both satisfied, they were different. In particular, the terms under
the discriminant determining whether the roots were real or imaginary were different. They
could be positive or negative, giving rise to either asymptoticity or cyclicity in the path to
equilibrium, depending on the sizes of some parameters or slopes. There suddenly spread
before me now a whole new world of implications including the “principle of effective
market classification.” I was so taken with the idea--elated might be a better word--that I put
pencil and paper down, to prolong the enjoyment of the suspense about what would, with a
little more work, unfold!      
One implication of the model was that a domestic boom (shift up and right of the XX curve)
would raise interest rates, attract capital inflows, appreciate the real exchange rate, and
worsen the balance of trade, a conclusion that would hold under either fixed or flexible
exchange rates. This was very relevant to an understanding of the Canadian economy, which
was the only major country with a flexible exchange rate, in the 1950s, and of course later
very relevant for understanding the Reagan boom in the early 1980s, and the ERM crisis in
the early 1990s. Under the old Keynesian model, which typically assumed capital
immobility, it was generally assumed that domestic expansion would weaken the currency.
After the article appeared, I had a nice letter from Harry Johnson, saying something to the
effect that it carried the subject to a different level and far away in Buenos Aires, Julio
Oliviera wrote to tell me that he was using it already in his classes!
IV
1n 1959-61, I taught at the Johns Hopkins SAIS Bologna Center, where I finalized several
articles for publication: the AER (1961)“The Pure Theory of International Trade,” “Optimum
Currency Areas, “ the Kyklos 1961 article, and the Can. Jour. 1961 article. I spent two years
in Bologna and thought it was time to get back into the mainstream. The offer from the
International Monetary Fund was particularly appealing. When I came to the Fund in
September 1961, Marcus Fleming, Chief of the Special Studies Division in the Research
Department, was away, and Jacques Polak, head of the Department, suggested that I work
on a problem that had come up in economic policy circles in the United States. There was
a great debate going in the U.S. government about the use of monetary and fiscal policy, with
different approaches suggested by the Chamber of Commerce, the Council of Economic
Advisors, and the Keynesians. The Keynesians wanted expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies; the Chamber of Commerce wanted tight monetary and fiscal policies; and the
Council of Economic Advisers, strongly influenced by Paul Samuelson (President John F.
Kennedy’s first choice as Chairman of the CEA) and James Tobin, a Member of the CEA,
wanted to use monetary and fiscal policy in different directions, with low interest rates to
spur growth and a budget surplus to siphon off the excess liquidity. The theory behind the
policy mix was called the Samuelson-Tobin “neoclassical synthesis.”
When Polak asked me to work on this problem, I replied: “But I already solved that problem
in my Kyklos article. Polak  replied that “not enough people had got the message and I should
try again!” 
So I took up what was essentially a selling job! The problem was to make the case succinctly,
and I hit upon the idea of using the two equations representing policy goals–internal and
external balance–in target space, with monetary policy on one axis and fiscal policy on the
other. Thus was born the “Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and
External Stability.”  I wrote it in a week, and it was on Marcus Fleming’s desk when he
returned from his vacation.
David Meiselman, then working in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, came over
to the Fund to introduce himself and asked what I had been working on. I told him and he
asked me what I thought of what I had written. I said that I felt like Bizet, after he had written
the Toreador Song to Carmen: “If it’s trash they want, I’ll give it to them!”
Fleming approved the paper, and it circulated as a Departmental Memorandum, which meant
that it went to the governments of all the member countries, but most importantly, of course,
to the US government. It was an immediate candidate for publication in the IMF Staff
Papers, but it created quite a fuss. All kinds of objections to it were made: it was “contrary
to US policy,” it would have a “bad influence on developing countries,” there was “no
difference between monetary and fiscal policy,” the “use of monetary and fiscal policy in
opposite directions would cancel out,” and so on.) Graeme Dorrance, on the Editorial Board,
told me he was initially against it for Staff Papers, but when he heard the other objections,
he changed his mind. What saved it for Staff Papers was that the Editorial Board couldn’t
reach agreement on reasons for rejecting it! 
The article provided a new way of thinking about macroeconomic policy. At first it wasn’t
popular. This was to be expected since it recommended a complete reversal in the current
prevailing policy mix. The Samuelson-Tobin neoclassical synthesis might have had some
merits in a closed economy, but it was completely indefensible in an open economy on fixed
exchange rates.
Fortunately for the United States (and me), President Kennedy reversed the policy mix to that
of tax cuts to spur growth in combination with tight money to protect the balance of
payments. The result was the longest expansion ever (up to that time) in the history of the
U.S. economy, unmatched until the Reagan expansion of the 1980s. 
 
Meanwhile, however, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors had mounted an attack on my
paper. Herbert Furth (Gottfried Haberler’s brother-in-law) and Robert Solomon wrote a sharp
critique. Instead of answering it point by point, I wrote the Canadian Journal paper that is
usually cited as the locus classicus of my half of the Mundell-Fleming model!
In my IMF paper, monetary policy had a comparative advantage in correcting the balance of
payments. The critical assumption was that capital flows were responsive to interest rates.
I decided to reply to the Federal Reserve critique by upping the ante, assuming complete
capital mobility. This made the opposite policy mix even more absurd, because it showed that
under fixed rates and perfect capital mobility, monetary policy was completely impotent.
Open market operations to buy Treasuries would result in equivalent gold losses or build-up
of dollar balances. The paper was presented at the Spring meetings of the Canadian
Economic and Political Science Association in Quebec, and published in the November 1963
issue of the Canadian Journal. This is the article that, as I said, has been so frequently
reproduced and is usually cited in the Mundell-Fleming literature. A critical comment on it




Meanwhile, Marcus Fleming had been writing his paper, “Domestic Financial Policies Under
Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates,” published in the November 1962 issue of IMF Staff
Papers. This article was later published again in his collected papers on international
economics, just following a paper written in 1958 on “Exchange Depreciation, Financial
Policy and the Domestic Price Level.” The latter paper is entirely in the Bickerdike-
Robinson-Metzler-Meade tradition and show no traces of what came to be called
international macroeconomics. But his 1962 paper is an almost fully-mature international
macroeconomic model, and this constitutes Fleming’s contribution to the Mundell-Fleming
model.  
The question arises as to the relation between the two models. He had probably been working
on his model before I arrived at the Fund, and of course my papers owed nothing to his. He
had certainly read my QJE 1960, Kyklos 1961, and Canadian Journal 1961 papers, as well
as the paper on the policy mix I wrote at the Fund and which he approved.  When he was
putting the finishing touches on his own paper in the spring of 1962, he asked me which of
my articles I thought he should refer to. I said, why not them all? But he said, “No, I am only
going to refer to one of them!” That’s exactly what he did! Curiously, he chose the least
relevant article to his or my topic--my 1961 Can. Jour. Paper, on “Employment Policy and
Flexible Exchange Rates.” (Even more curiously enough, he repeated the reference to this
paper alone years later when, in 1969, he published his article on “Wider Exchange Margins”
as Chapter 13 in his collection of essays, Essays in International Economics (London: Allen
& Unwin: 1971).) What must have been going through his mind to single out that paper
(which showed that commercial policy was ineffective or counterproductive under flexible
exchange rates but no capital mobility) as the most relevant of my papers on monetary and
fiscal policy?  
There is a difference between our articles that gets Marcus into trouble. On the second page
of his article, he examines the effect of an expansionary shift in fiscal policy in the form of
an increase in public expenditure under (a) fixed and (b) flexible exchange rates. The
increase in expenditure leads, he says, to a  deterioration in the current account. Then he
writes: “In order to isolate the effect of a change in budgetary policy, it is necessary to
assume that monetary policy remains, in some sense, unchanged. In this essay, that is taken
to mean that the stock of money is held constant....” 
But this assumption is not consistent with fixed exchange rates. As I showed in my Kyklos
1961 paper, “The International Disequilibrium System,” sterilization policy is incompatible
with fixed exchange rates, and leads to a “disequilibrium system.” 
Here is the problem. With a stock of money constant, the increase in government expenditure
will increase interest rates, which will check expenditure and lead to an increased net capital
inflow. While the trade balance worsens, the capital account improves, and this means that
the balance of payments may improve or worsen depending on certain coefficients (in my
framework, it will worsen or improve depending on whether the LL curve has a flatter or
steeper slope than the FF curve). Fleming now has to conclude with “...if the policy of
budgetary expansion results in a deterioration of the balance of payments, shortage of
reserves may ultimately lead the authorities to abandon the policy and to renounce the
associated expansion in income and employment.”  His system has no mechanism of
adjustment for the balance of payments. 
In my earliest works on the model I identified monetary policy with interest rate policy. That
was certainly true in my Canadian Journal paper and probably explains why Marcus chose
that paper to refer to. It makes a starker contrast between our models. Later, however, when
I made the assumption of perfect capital mobility, monetary policy had to be redefined and
was correctly treated as an open market operation, or a change in domestic credit. The money
supply is an endogenous variable under fixed exchange rates. 
In my Kyklos paper I showed that the balance of payments can be kept in disequilibrium
under fixed exchange rates only if automatic effects of reserve changes on the money supply
are sterilized, a temporary solution. Had Fleming used constant domestic assets (no open
market operations) as the criterion of a constant monetary policy, he would have been able
to complete his analysis of the effects of an increase in government expenditure.
VI
I am not quite sure when the term “Mundell-Fleming model” first appeared in the literature.
I know the coiner of the term from the horse’s mouth: Rudiger Dornbusch.  Let me relate a
kind of anecdote. At a conference in March 1997 in Claremont, CA, I was objecting to the
use of the misleading term, “Marshall-Lerner condition,” a term that originated with Charles
Kindleberger. The relevant Marshall here is the writer of the Pure Theory of Foreign Trade,
written in the 1870s, and the Lerner refers to the Economics of Control, written in the 1940s.
Marshall had of course died (1924) several years before Lerner became an economist (early
1930s) and their themes were quite different. Marshall was talking about changes in relative
prices (the terms of trade), while Lerner was talking about the exchange rate.  Marshall
would have been absolutely horrified at the connection, when he took such careful pains to
distinguish between the terms of trade and the exchange rate and to reject any hint of a
connection between the stability of his barter model (based on Mill) and the stability of
exchange rates. He explicitly made it clear that the reader should not confuse the exchange
rate with the terms of trade.
Max Corden then asked me why, if I objected to that connection, did I object to the name
“Fleming-Mundell” model rather than “Mundell-Fleming model.” I pointed out what I have
said above that his work, if not dependent on, at least followed, mine, whereas mine was
completely independent of his. He had read my earlier papers. That was one of the reasons
he wanted me to come to his Special Studies Division in the Fund.
I am by no means suggesting that Fleming’s work wasn’t in an important sense independent
of mine. Mine preceded his in publication but not necessarily in conception. His work was
certainly to a large extent, subjectively (to use Schumpeter’s phrase) original. You can see
a connection in his model to a paper he wrote on macroeconomics in the late 1930s,
analyzing a closed economy in a quasi-general equilibrium framework.  The problem was
something the fund had to deal with and it was natural that he would have tried his hand at
solving it when it had become such a bone of contention in the U.S. The assumptions, style
and notation are characteristic of Fleming and have no connection to my work. The notation
is completely anti-mnemonic!
Marcus Fleming was a gifted and original economist. He was a “purist” in many senses.
Sometimes this trait, combined with his integrity, would get in the way. When he was
working at the U.K. Treasury in the 1940s, he was aghast, Lionel Robbins once told me, to
find that the government was accepting the Treasury’s recommendations for the wrong
reasons. He would rather be right than president!  
He could be exasperating to people in his division. A couple of stories, called up from the
far recesses of the mind, can be mentioned. I used to go into the office quite early, and stay
late, partly to avoid the rush hour. But for an hour or two after lunch I was not to be seen. I
was jogging at the nearby Washington Athletic Club! Long after I left the Fund, Ann
Romanis told me that Marcus would frequently come to see me after lunch and get in a
frightful stew when I was not to be found. At the same time, Ann would come into my office
tearing her hair after an intensive discussion with Marcus, usually about “incomes policy.”

Despite his predisposition for precision, Marcus considered himself a Keynesian. In the
spring of 1963, I presented my “return-to-the-classics” paper, “Barter Theory and the
Monetary Mechanism of Adjustment,” (Ch. 8 in International Economics) at a Fund seminar.
This paper would later start a kind of Mundell-Dornbusch literature. It was then that Fleming
made his humorous comment that there were only two Keynesians left at the Fund: himself
and the Managing-Director (Per Jacobbsen)!” Marcus was best at developing and refining
fine points and details in abstract theory rather than in the rough-and-tumble and necessarily
inexact world of forging new systems. 
He really disliked my shift toward classical economics, and in his written comments on it,
he penciled in “lament for economics.” It never saw the light of day as a Fund paper, and
Marcus had the chance to critique it in detail (but unsuccessfully!) when he was its discussant
at the 1965 World Bank Conference where I first presented it outside the Fund. It is
interesting to note that the literature that came from that paper thus also originated at the
Fund, as did my earliest JPE papers on inflation theory.      
There was no Mundell-Fleming paper. We never collaborated on macroeconomics. But there
is a Fleming-Mundell paper, “Official Intervention on the Forward Exchange Market,”
published in IMF Staff Papers (March 1964). Marcus wrote the first draft of this paper and
it was his idea to treat the forward market as a stock, rather than a flow market. It’s a great
idea and it’s a pity the article has been somewhat neglected. I developed the diagrams and
the explanations. In the exchanges between us, relating to our two-country framework, I
replaced his “A” and “non-A” with “A” and “B”. We went through this exchange a couple
of rounds, but he had the last word. That was my first and (almost) last experience with
collaboration!
VII
Now let me say a few words about my relations with Egon Sohmen. I finished at MIT in
1956. I guess Sohmen graduated in 1958. I never saw his thesis, and as far as I can
remember, did not meet him until December 1964 at Bellagio, when we were both members
of the Bellagio-Princeton G-32 Group organized by Fritz Machlup, Robert Triffin and Willie
Fellner.  Egon was an advocate of flexible exchange rates, an admirer of Milton Friedman’s
brand of liberalism as well as his position of exchange rates. The first piece I saw of his—and
I’m not sure where it was—centered part of the argument around exchange stability and the
theorem, originally developed by Alfred Marshall in the 1870s, that an unstable equilibrium
must be flanked by two stable equilibriums. The condition for a stable equilibrium was that
the sum of the elasticities exceed unity. 
There was always a problem with this analysis that had surfaced earlier with the so-called
Marshall-Lerner condition. Marshall’s original analysis in the 1870s, a  version of which was
circulated (but not published) in his 1879 manuscript, The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade,”
made use of the relative price of exports and imports, i.e., the terms of trade, and he warned
explicitly against the mistake of equating this ratio with the exchange rate, which was the
relative price of two currencies. It would only be related to the exchange rate in the context
of an economy where export prices in each country were fixed in terms of domestic currency,
a situation that would apply only in a Keynesian unemployment model. An analysis of
exchange stability must include explicit markets for two currencies, and there is no reason
to believe that stocks of currency demands would be related one-to-one to flows of
commodity demand.  
I liked Egon, and dorsed his strong advocacy of liberal (in the European sense) economics,
and I respected him as an astute economist. When I organized (with Harry Johnson) the
Conference on International Monetary Problems at the University of Chicago, he was high
on the list of invitees. I had divided the program into a set of twelve problems. Egon Sohmen
agreed to write on the “Assignment Problem”-- the dynamic matching of instruments to
targets--a key issue in the general adjustment problem. This paper was matched with Ron
McKinnon’s paper on “Portfolio Balance and International Payments Adjustment,” and both
of course came out in the proceedings of the conference in the Mundell-Swoboda volume,
Monetary Problems of the International Economy, published by the University of Chicago
Press in 1969.  
In his paper, Sohmen reviews my contributions with respect to the assignment problem and
notes (p. 185 f. of the Mundell-Swoboda volume) that he had come to similar conclusions:
“The crucial difference in the effectiveness of monetary policy under fixed and flexible
exchange rates was also pointed out in my Flexible Exchange Rates (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1961, esp. pp. 83-90 and 123-24.” 
Sohmen makes a contribution here by linking the discussion of the assignment problem to
my theory of optimum currency areas. He fully recognized that a system in which both spot
and forward exchange rates were fixed was virtually equivalent to monetary unification, and
he recognized that completely fixed exchange rates could work “with no appreciably
disastrous consequences, within unified currency areas.” He concludes that “The first and
foremost “assignment problem” for macroeconomic policy in any country is whether or not
it should have its own currency. The degree of factor mobility between regions is probably
the single most important criterion for that decision.” This conclusion shows that our
thinking on the theory of the subject was not very far apart.
VIII 
The 1966 conference and its book, in addition to my International Economics, published in
1968 did much to launch the international  macroeconomic model. The best case that can be
made for the model is that for the first time it provided the tools for analyzing the impact of
important monetary and fiscal policy changes on large economies interacting with one
another. Prior to 1960 there had been no way of analyzing in a rigorous model the effects of
monetary and fiscal policy changes on exchange rates, budget balances, trade balances,
interest rates, capital flows and exchange rates in the home country and abroad. After the
development of that model, analysis of the effects of, say, the US fiscal expansion in the
1980s and the German fiscal expansion in the 1990s became child’s play for undergraduates.
    
This is not to say that the conclusions were applicable to all countries. The Mundell-Fleming
framework works best in the context of advanced countries with highly developed capital
markets and convertible currencies. It had much less to offer developing countries where
capital flows were conditioned heavily by country risk considerations and where currencies
were subject to chronic inflationary pressures. My 1964 Canadian Journal paper
generalizing the model to the world context was the last I wrote in the Mundell-Fleming
framework, partly because I had come to the view that small open economies could be best
understood in a more classical framework, and to that end it was necessary to incorporate
monetary features into the classical barter model. 
In a later incarnation, I started to pay more attention to the incentive effects of tax systems
and the need to distinguish clearly between fiscal expansion achieved through increases in
government spending and fiscal expansion achieved through cuts in tax rates. The success
of the supply-side tax cuts during the Kennedy and Reagan administration in the United
States contrasted sharply with the indifferent success or failure of the massive increases in
government spending in the German economy in the 1990s.  
The Future of the Open Economy Macromodels
The international macromodel for the first time provided the framework for analyzing the
economic impact of policy changes and economic disturbances. Prior to the 1960s there did
not exist any model that could analyze the effects of monetary and fiscal policy changes on
exchange rates, budget balances, trade balances, interest rates, capital flows and exchange
rates. After the 1960s, analysis of monetary and fiscal policy changes became standard
textbook fare for undergraduates.
One of the surprising conclusions of the model was that fiscal expansion could lead to
appreciation of a country’s currency. I don’t think anyone would have suggested this
conclusion before the 1960s. Yet it took on much greater significance after the US fiscal
expansion of the 1980s and the German fiscal expansion of the 1990s. In both these cases the
home currency soared. A similar analysis could be used to interpret the effects of fiscal
expansion in Japan on the yen during the 1990s.
But this surprising feature of the model should also alert us to limits on the applicability of
the analysis. The conclusions are not inevitable. They do not apply to all countries and it
applies only if certain things remain unchanged. In 1961 Egon Sohmen and I came
independently to the conclusion that  whether fiscal expansion strengthens or weakens the
balance of payments and therefore appreciates or depreciates the home currency depends on
the relative responsiveness of capital flows and liquidity preferences to interest rates, in my
framework whether the external balance schedule is flatter or steeper than the liquidity
preference schedule. It is no accident that the three countries noted above, the United States,
Japan and Germany are not only the three largest economies in the world but also among the
richest and most developed with huge capital markets, and that the fiscal expansion was in
each case conducted under conditions which kept money tight.  
The conclusion would apply to very few if any developing countries. One reason is that fiscal
expansion in those countries is almost always accompanied by easy money and therefore
outward speculation against the currency. In many many developing countries there is not
much difference between monetary and fiscal policy first because there is not much of a
capital market in the local currency, and second, because monetary expansion quickly
follows upon fiscal deficits. I myself do not use or like my students to use the Mundell-
Fleming version of the international macromodel in developing countries.  
The model is in many respects seriously outdated. First, it needs to be adjusted for the
necessary distinction between real and nominal interest rates to take into account anticipated
and actual inflation. Second, it need to allow specifically for growth. Third, it needs to have
explicitly incorporated into it features of the theory of international transfers. Fourth, it needs
to take into account longer-run debt accumulation problem of international indebtedness.
Fifth, supply-side incentive effects need to be taken into account when fiscal policy shocks
in the form of tax changes are under analysis. Whether it is better to keep the basic model and
incorporate in it these changes—the method of “immanent criticism”—or build an entirely
new model is something for future researchers to decide.    
 .   
This presents us with a choice: Should we update the model or scrap it and start again? One
way or another, certain key changes need to be made in it.
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This is not to say that the model conclusions were applicable to all countries. The Mundell-
Fleming framework works best in the context of advanced countries with highly developed
capital markets and convertible currencies. It had much less to offer developing countries
where capital flows were conditioned heavily by country risk considerations and where
currencies were subject to chronic inflationary pressures. My 1964 Canadian Journal paper
generalizing the model to the world context was the last I wrote in the Mundell-Fleming
framework, partly because I had come to the view that small open economies could be best
understood in a more classical framework, and to that end it was necessary to incorporate
monetary features into the classical barter model. 
In a later incarnation, I started to pay more attention to the incentive effects of tax systems
and the need to distinguish clearly between fiscal expansion achieved through increases in
government spending and fiscal expansion achieved through cuts in tax rates. The success
of the supply-side tax cuts during the Kennedy and Reagan administration in the United
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government spending in the German economy in the 1990s.  
